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I. INTRODUCTION
Peter Westen's and James Mangiafico's recent article arguing that duress is a
justification is interesting, provocative, and dead wrong.' It barely dents (never
mind demolishes) the majority view that duress is an excuse, one grounded on the
notion that it is unjust to punish someone who has violated the criminal law only
because he failed to resist a motivation that could not have been resisted by anyone
who claims the right to punish him.
Westen and Mangiafico (hereinafter "W & M") make two major errors. First,
W & M show that hypothetical cases that are identifiable as duress on relatively
uncontroversial criteria are analyzable as cases of justified action. While they
succeed in this effort, they fail to show that there is no case of duress that can also
be analyzed as a case of excuse. That is, they fail to show that duress is a
justification in the sense that they apparently intend: that duress is in all cases a
justification and never an excuse.2 Second, to the extent W & M believe that their
examples can be analyzed as justification but not as excuse, they are mistaken.
They misconceive excuse, confusing it with non-fault. While their arguments and
examples show that fault is present in duress cases, W & M say little or nothing
about genuine excuse. As a result, they fail to demonstrate that duress cases are
exclusively analyzable as justification. It is possible to reconfigure W & M's
thesis to make it more plausible. But it is an open question whether the
reconfiguration would be acceptable to them and, in any event, the reconfiguration
does not capture all that we want to accomplish with an excuse of duress.
II. THREE WAYS OF LOOKING AT DURESS
According to W & M, a case of duress has three identifying features: a three
party relationship; a purposefully coercive threat; and less protection for the
defendant than self-defense but more protection than necessity.3 It is the last
feature that occupies W & M for the most part. They focus on the fact that
whereas self-defense doctrine authorizes the use of deadly force to oppose the
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2 See id. at 925.
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lesser harm of kidnapping or rape, duress does not allow one to use more force or
to inflict greater harm on a bystander than one is threatened with by an aggressor.4
I cannot kill a bystander to save my own life from an aggressor, nor can I kill a
bystander to spare myself an assault at the hands of an aggressor, nor can I assault
or kill bystanders to fend off an aggressor's threat to my property. W & M are also
concerned to explain why duress is available when a defense of necessity is not;
that is, when the balance of harms does not favor the defendant's violating the
law.5 In a classic example based on the Model Penal Code, I can run over two
drunks lying in the road if my passenger holds a gun to my head and tells me to do
it; but in a case of natural necessity, such as a brake failure on a mountain road, I
cannot run over two drunks lying in the road if the alternative is killing only
myself by swerving to avoid them.
W & M find the key to these features of duress in the fact that duress is
confined to human threats and is unavailable against natural threats. They argue
that duress fits with the justifications because it is a matter of choosing the lesser
evil from the defendant's point of view.6 They account for the availability of
duress where necessity is not available by arguing that the calculus of evils must be
sensitive to context, including the nature of the threat.7 Where the threat is a
purposively coercive threat by another human being, this is itself a distinctive evil
that often will outweigh apparently greater evils from other sources. As a result, it
is often not the case that an apparently greater evil (two dead drunks) actually
outweighs the purposively coercive threat to the (one) defendant from an
aggressor. W & M support this analysis by pointing to self-defense. It is just this
kind of context-sensitive evaluation of evils, appreciating the full significance of
human threats, that accounts for self-defense's authorization of a disproportionate
response of deadly force in defending oneself against rape or kidnapping. When
viewed according to this hierarchy of contextually-evaluated threats, the
justifications include duress in a slot between self-defense and necessity.8
This argument is clever and plausible, but it falls short of demonstrating that
duress is a justification in the sense that W & M apparently have in mind: that it is
exclusively a justification and not an excuse. To begin with, there is nothing
remarkable about duress cases being analyzable as justification. Take a textbook
case of duress: State v. Toscano.9 Toscano was a chiropractor who owed a
gambling debt to some gangsters. One of the gangsters told Toscano that if he
refused to sign some medical reports to facilitate an insurance fraud scheme, then
4 See id. at 855-57.
Id. at 857-62.
6 Id. at 916.
7 Id. at 923-24.
8 Id. at 931-44.
9 378 A.2d 755 (N.J. 1977). Toscano is used to illustrate duress in a leading criminal law
casebook. See SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES:
CASES AND MATERIALS 845 (7th ed. 2001).
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he and his wife would be hurt in some way. Toscano signed the forms. The case
can be analyzed as one of duress: the threat of injury to Toscano and his wife was
one that a person of reasonable firmness would not have been able to resist. But
the case also can be analyzed as one of justification. The property loss from
insurance fraud was a lesser evil than the threatened physical harm to Toscano and
his wife.
Furthermore, there is nothing new in the suggestion that the harms at issue in
cases of justification must be evaluated in a context-sensitive way. Two common
contextualizing moves make it a simple matter to analyze most cases of duress as
lesser evils. First, prospective harms must always be discounted by their
probability. Changes in this discounting often can change an apparent choice of
the greater evil into a choice of lesser evil. In Toscano, for example, a lesser-evils
defense is more plausible if the likelihood of the gangster's succeeding in the
insurance scam is portrayed as remote and the injury to Toscano and his wife is
portrayed as imminent and virtually certain. Conversely, Toscano can be seen as
choosing the greater evil if we suppose that the insurance fraud is assured of
success, while the threat to Toscano and his wife is delivered by a puny and inept
gangster.
Second, to overcome a defendant's claim of justification, his conduct must be
shown to be "at fault"-usually on a reasonableness standard-and this, like all
fault inquiries, serves to contextualize our evaluation of the defendant's conduct.
To understand this point, it is necessary to explain why and how fault is shown in
justification cases. Any justification defense is the rest of the prohibition, so to
speak. To clarify: It is not unlawful to kill a human being; it is unlawful to kill a
human being without a good reason to do so (without a justification), such as self-
defense or the defense-of-others. If the state wishes to punish, then it must show
that the prohibition was violated completely, not just in part. This is why the
prosecution bears the burden, in self-defense and other justifications, of persuading
the jury that some element of the justification is absent from the case: that there
was no imminence, or no necessity, or no proportionality in the response, and so
on. But under a modem elements approach to criminal fault, as found in the
Model Penal Code, the state must do even more than this. If the prosecution must
show criminal fault with regard to each and every element of the offense as
defined, then the continuity between offense elements and the absence of a
justifying circumstance implies that the prosecution must show criminal fault with
regard to the absence of ajustifying circumstance as well. Typically, it must show
that the defendant was negligent-unreasonable-with regard to there being no
imminence, or no necessity, or no proportionality in the response, or whatever the
case may be. This inquiry can result in an acquittal, not on an actual justification,
but on a mistaken justification, if the actor was reasonably mistaken.' 0 Toscano,
10 This analysis of mistaken justification differs fundamentally from that of George Fletcher
and Paul Robinson, both of whom interpret mistaken justification as resulting in an excuse. See
GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 762-69 (1978); PAUL H. ROBINSON, STRUCTURE
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for example, may have miscalculated the likelihood of the threat to his family and
the relative harm of that discounted threat as compared to that of the insurance
scam. However, he may not have miscalculated those relative harms unreasonably
(it may have been a close call), and he may as a result be free of fault and therefore
innocent.
Nothing in these contextualized analyses of Toscano's justification defense is
inconsistent with his also arguing that he was under duress, or with his framing
that duress argument in terms of an excuse. Toscano can make either of the
arguments given above and also argue that, if they fail, he has a third possible
ground of acquittal. If he is neither justified nor free of fault regarding his not
being justified, then he should be acquitted nevertheless because he faced a threat
that he could not withstand, and that no one who would punish him could have
withstood either. No one, if faced with a choice between signing a fraudulent
medical form and remaining idle while his loved ones are assaulted or killed,
would choose the latter course. No one, therefore, has a moral right to punish
Toscano. Although he has done wrong and is not justified, he is entitled to be
excused.
Similarly, nothing in W & M's contextualizing argument-that, when
evaluated in context, a purposive coercive threat from a human being is actually a
greater evil than an apparently greater evil from another source-is inconsistent
with an argument of duress or with framing that duress argument in terms of an
excuse. When they adjust the evaluation of the purposive coercive threat from a
human source upward relative to other threats from other sources, W & M do no
more than expand the necessity defense. To take account of the distinctiveness of
human threats in justification analysis is not to demonstrate that no duress case can
be analyzed as excuse.
III. DURESS AND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN FAULT AND FAIR CANDIDACY
W & M apparently suppose that they have demonstrated that duress must be
analyzed exclusively as a justification and never as an excuse. If so, the most
likely reason for their mistake is that they rely on a common but confused notion
of what an excuse is. They write:
Defenses of excuse exist for the same reason that it is a defense to
commit the actus reus of an offense without mens rea. A person who
commits the actus reus of an offense without mens rea has a defense
because, by virtue of lacking the purpose, knowledge, recklessness or
negligence the statute requires, he lacks the motivation of malice,
callousness, indifference, or neglect toward the interests of others that the
statute regards as an essential condition to justly blaming him. The same
AND FUNCTION IN THE CRIMINAL LAW 102 (1997). Like W & M, Fletcher and Robinson fall victim to
the ambiguity of "culpability" and confuse non-fault with excuse. See infra Part III.
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is true of excuse. Indeed, excuse can be regarded as the genus for which
lack of mens rea is species. An actor has a defense of excuse if he lacks
the motivation that the statute regards as an essential condition for just
blaming.' 1
In this analysis, W & M fall victim to the ambiguity of the concept of
"culpability." They fail to distinguish between fault, or culpability as part of the
structure of wrongdoing on one hand; and, on the other hand, non-excuse, or
culpability in the sense of fair candidacy for punishment according to the
conditions of responsibility.
When we find someone at fault, we are saying that their violation of a
prohibition is more than a nominal violation, and that the defendant deserves
punishment. If, for example, I kill another human being then I have violated the
prohibition on homicide; but if the killing was wholly accidental-not only
inadvertent, but also non-negligent-then it is only a nominal violation of the
prohibition on homicide and I do not deserve punishment. The difference lies
largely in the malice or callousness that W & M cite, though there is much more to
this story. Criminal fault is an inference, drawn in the course of the adjudication of
wrongdoing, to the effect that the practical reasoning of the defendant is
deficient.12 If I kill another human being purposely, then the reasoning that led me
to kill, as represented by this intentional mental state, is deficient. However, it is
important to see that the purpose to kill is indeed only representative of my
deficient practical reasoning. The intentional state is an indicator of criminal fault;
it is not identical to criminal fault.
In many places, the criminal law's assessment of the quality of the
defendant's practical reasoning is not limited to the intentional state of mind that
accompanies the conduct at issue. It extends, in addition, to the defendant's set of
standing motivations, or ends-to their acquisition, development, maintenance,
and ultimate issuance in the alleged offense. The most familiar example of this
kind of fault inquiry is criminal negligence, but the same kind of long-view
assessment of the defendant's practical reasoning is made under the doctrines of
transferred intent, felony murder, and reckless indifference murder. It also shows
up in the ex post normative determinations that judges and juries are asked to make
within the familiar intentional state formulations of fault: for example, whether a
risk is "substantial and unjustifiable" in the Model Penal Code's definition of
recklessness. From this perspective, criminal fault is an aspect of criminal
wrongdoing. That is, the manner, circumstances, and specifics of the individual
1 Westen & Mangiafico, supra note 1, at 872-73.
12 This conception of fault is developed and defended in: Kyron Huigens, Solving the
Apprendi Puzzle, 90 GEO. L.J. 387 (2002); Kyron Huigens, The Dead End of Deterrence, and
Beyond, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 943 (2000); Kyron Huigens, Virtue and Inculpation, 108 HARV. L.
REV. 1423, 1458-62 (1995) [hereinafter Huigens, Virtue].
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instance of wrongdoing alleged against the defendant are the subject matter of the
adjudicative assessment of the quality of his practical reasoning.' 3
Non-excuse-fair candidacy according to the conditions of responsibility-is
something entirely different from fault.' 4 For one thing, an excused actor usually
is at fault. Attempted presidential assassin John Hinckley, for example, intended
to kill a human being. However, as a separate matter, the state of his capacities or
circumstances was such that he could not have been rationally addressed by the
criminal law: he could not have been an equal participant in the collective,
normative, conduct-governing, evaluative projects of the criminal law. To punish
him, therefore, would have been to do nothing more than to use him as an example
to others. In short, he was not a fair candidate for punishment. Non-excuse, unlike
fault, is not a part of the structure of wrongdoing. One might say it concerns the
prior question of whether it makes moral sense to hang the case on the structure of
criminal wrongdoing at all.
Criminal fault as I have described it concerns the quality of the defendant's
practical reasoning. Fair candidacy, in contrast, concerns the defendant's capacity
for practical reasoning. Criminal fault is indifferent to moral luck-one is held
responsible for the state of one's ends and practical reasoning on the ground that
deliberation on ends is a feature of an ordinary moral life. Fair candidacy for
punishment, in contrast, is sensitive to moral luck; to the fact that not all moral
lives are ordinary, and that deliberation on ends is sometimes difficult, sometimes
impossible, and sometimes simply irrelevant to one's actions. In Hinckley's case,
for example, our inquiry into fault tells us that he deserves punishment for his
attempt to kill-because our legal inquiry into fault is limited to the question of his
purpose to kill. But his insanity defense presents a different question: whether it is
fundamentally fair to apply that legal inquiry into fault (or any of the rest of the
conceptual apparatus of the punishment system) to his case at all. As it happens,
that question was answered in the negative: Hinckley was excused. He acted as he
did only because, as a matter of moral luck, he was insane.
One way to see the distinction between fault and fair candidacy is to apply the
test of an aggravating converse. Compare two common mitigating considerations:
minor participation in the crime, and youth. Minor participation in a crime has an
aggravating converse: a leadership role in a crime merits greater punishment. The
level of participation is thus a fault element: it serves to grade this instance of the
offense by means of its bi-directional relevance. Youth, in contrast, has no
aggravating converse. A judge at sentencing might say to a defendant "You're old
enough to know better," but this would only be to deny him the mitigation. The
judge would never go on to use non-youth in an aggravating way. She would not
say, "If you were middle-aged, I'd throw the book at you; and if you were elderly,
13 The imposition of responsibility for the state of one's ends is part of a system of just
punishment, in part because the proper disposition of individual actors' ends is one of the objectives
of punishment. Huigens, Virtue, supra note 12, at 1456-62.
4 See Kyron Huigens, Rethinking the Penalty Phase, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1195, 1245-54 (2000).
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you'd be looking at a death sentence." Neither old age, middle age, nor youth
serves to grade the offense. Youth ordinarily pertains to the threshold conditions
of responsibility, or fair candidacy for punishment, and it bears primarily on
excuse for offenses, mitigation in sentencing, and the jurisdiction of juvenile
courts. Youth, usually, is a matter apart from the structure of wrongdoing.
The qualifiers "ordinarily," "primarily," and "usually" in that last paragraph
are important. The distinction between fault and fair candidacy is not a distinction
between kinds of elements, but rather between the functions to which elements are
applied. Youth can serve as a fault element, even if it usually pertains to fair
candidacy. In so-called statutory rape, youth grades the offense according to
severity and defines the threshold between criminal and innocent conduct, both of
which are functions of fault.
The problem with W & M's analysis of duress as an excuse is that they have
confused non-fault and excuse. They describe excuse as an argument that one's
conduct is "not the product of the kind of disregard of others that the jurisdiction at
hand represents actors to have possessed when it publicly condemns actors for
engaging in such conduct."' 5 But this is an argument of non-fault, not an argument
of excuse. W & M go on to insist that an excuse of duress should not be
recognized because to do so weakens the moral stringency of the criminal law.
They write:
To be sure, one might argue that moral frailty in duress cases in [sic]
unique, because actors whose moral frailty causes them to do the wrong
thing in the face of threats simply "can't help it." But to say that an
ordinary person whose moral frailty causes him consciously to do the
wrong thing simply "can't help it" is to speak metaphorically. It's a
metaphor for saying of him, "He wants it more than he should." And it
is precisely when actors engage in misconduct because they want it
"more than they should" that they become appropriate objects of public
reprobation. 16
This is an apt description of a person whose conduct exhibits fault. His long-
term practical reasoning is deficient, and the law rightly holds him responsible for
the wrongdoing that his disordered ends lead him to commit. W & M undoubtedly
are correct when they say, in effect, that our standards of criminal fault should
reflect our condemnation of this shoddy practical reasoning, and that to do
otherwise would weaken the stringency of the criminal law. The problem is that
this has nothing to do with excuse. We inquire into fault in punishment because
the governance of long-term practical reasoning and the assembly and maintenance
of a defensible set of ends is one of the main functions of punishment. But if an
aggressor holds a gun to the defendant's head, then her own powers of practical
15 Westen & Mangiafico, supra note 1, at 874.
16 Id. at 912 (citation omitted).
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reasoning have been effectively incapacitated and her own ends have been
rendered irrelevant. We will excuse her for the crime she is ordered to commit, but
not for a lack of fault. The bank employee with a gun to her head intends to
deprive the bank of its money, and commits a complete theft. While the law,
including its inquiries into fault, is stringently indifferent to moral luck, we who
would presume to punish find it impossible not to accommodate moral luck at the
extremes of adversity. We do this when we excuse in cases of minority and
insanity, and we also do it in the more contingent, occasional instances of practical
reason's incapacitation by duress.
W & M give examples in which fault is present and the only plausible defense
the defendant can offer is justification.' 7 But it does not follow from this that
duress cases are not cases of excuse. As in the Hinckley case, fault may be present
when the defendant nevertheless is not a fair candidate for punishment and should
be excused on that ground. In Toscano, we might conclude that the insurance
scam was of such a magnitude that it did in fact outweigh the prospective harm to
Toscano and his family. We might conclude, further, that Toscano was
unreasonable when he concluded otherwise. Nevertheless, if the prospective harm
to Toscano and his family was still very great, we might conclude that any one of
us who proposes to punish Toscano would have done the same thing that he did. If
so, it would not be fair for us to punish him. Because he is not a fair candidate for
punishment, we would excuse him.
There might seem to be a contradiction in this analysis between saying that
Toscano acted unreasonably and saying that most of us would have done the same
thing he did. There is no contradiction, however, because these are two different
questions. The first asks whether Toscano has violated a reasonable person
standard of conduct, a question having to do with the quality of his practical
reasoning. The second asks whether he has exhibited the fortitude of a person of
reasonable firmness, a question having to do with his capacity to engage in
practical reasoning or to give effect to his own reasoning in the circumstances of
the offense.
17 In one of the few examples they offer in this part of their article, W & M write:
Thus, imagine that X threatens D1 that X will injure a child who suffers from a mild ear-
ache unless D1 appropriates V's car and drives the child to the hospital. In the event D1
does as ordered, two things obtain: X is, indeed, guilty of unjustifiably causing D1 to
appropriate V's car, because Xknowingly causes the appropriation to occur without being
confronted with an appropriate choice of evils; and yet D1 is not guilty of unjustifiably
appropriating V's car, because he is confronted with a choice of evils, and, being so
confronted, he makes the appropriate choice under the circumstances by using V's car to
save the child.
Id. at 917. Here, D1 is at fault in that she purposely or knowingly steals V's car, and is justified for
the reason given. Neither of these conclusions is inconsistent with Dl's also being excused if the
threat to the child were sufficient to incapacitate DJ's practical reasoning and render DJ's own ends
moot.
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This is a subtle distinction in part because it turns on the functions to which
the inquiries are put. A person's fortitude, like his reasonableness, could be put to
use as a fault element. To do wrong when one knows better can be an aspect of
wrongdoing that helps to justify and grade punishment for that wrongdoing, just as
the reasonable person standard is ordinarily used. But this does not preclude us
from putting fortitude to work in connection with fair candidacy as well. If our
concern is not the virtue of the defendant but instead the virtue of the punishing
majority, then we in the punishing majority might well refrain from punishing in
those cases where the lack of fortitude is such that we probably share it, and where
to punish the person who lacks fortitude would be hypocritical on our part. In
other words, we might excuse the defendant on grounds of duress.
IV. DURESS AS NON-FAULT REGARDING THE ABSENCE OF A JUSTIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCE
It is possible to reconfigure W & M's thesis to reconcile it to the preceding
points while still retaining three of its principal features. However, even the
reconfigured thesis fails to exclude the possibility of duress as an excuse.
Duress as an excuse is premised on the idea that it is unfair to punish someone
of ordinary fortitude who nevertheless did wrong, precisely because their fortitude
is ordinary, even if inadequate; that is, because no one who would presume to
punish this wrongdoer would have made a different choice under the same
circumstances. The question of ordinary fortitude might be an empirical one, but
the decision not to punish for this reason is of course a normative one. This is not
an easy or obvious normative choice for a reason that I alluded to above: the
defendant's insufficient fortitude can be taken as a reason to punish as easily as it
can be taken as a reason not to punish. We can treat the question of the
defendant's fortitude as one of fault. We can say that a defendant who is so weak
willed as to give in to the temptation to embezzle money from his partners is at
fault in part because of that character flaw. We have not drafted our theft statutes
in a way that requires proof of lack of fortitude, or that grades the offense by
relative levels of fortitude. But we can say that the defendant's intention to
deprive others of their property reflects, among other things, his failure over time
to develop an acceptable level of fortitude, or resistance to temptation.
The relevance of fortitude to fault does not preclude its also being relevant to
fair candidacy. If the defendant does wrong and does so either intentionally or
unreasonably, we might still conclude that it is fundamentally unfair to punish him.
We might conclude this if he is six years old or if he is flagrantly insane, because
to punish such defendants would reveal us, the punishing majority, to be a cruel
and barbaric people. We might also conclude that it is fundamentally unfair to
punish a defendant if punishment in his case would reveal us to be self-righteous
and hypocritical. If the defendant embezzled from his partners because his family
was being held hostage, then without reassessing the defendant's intentions or
what they ordinarily tell us of fortitude, we can nevertheless decline to punish this
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defendant. We can leave our conclusions about fault and wrongdoing in place and
excuse on grounds of duress. He faced a hard choice and made the wrong choice,
with fault, but even a person of reasonable firmness would have done so.
Notice, however, that it is difficult to keep the analysis of the defendant's
wrong choice under circumstances of a hard choice from collapsing into our
assessment of his mistake about whether he was justified in acting as he did. If W
& M have an argument, this is it. The argument is not that duress is a justification.
Instead, the argument is that the centerpiece of duress, fortitude, is more relevant to
fault than it is to fair candidacy. If this is so, then cases of duress should be
analyzed as cases of mistaken justification, in which the defendant is said to be not
at fault; and these cases should not be analyzed as excuses, in which the defendant
is conceded to be at fault but is said to be unfairly subject to punishment. Our
embezzler might have believed that stealing was the right thing to do, in light of
the greater evil threatening his family. If he was wrong about this and is not
actually justified, we can say nevertheless that he was reasonably wrong about it,
and is not at fault regarding the absence of a justifying circumstance.
This approach preserves three important features of W & M's thesis: the
notion that duress should be analyzed as a matter of wrongdoing by the defendant
rather than as a matter of fairness by the punishing majority; the notion that a
context-sensitive evaluation of the defendant's wrongdoing is important to the
defense; and the notion that duress as an excuse fails to protect the stringency of
the criminal law.18 The differences between W & M's thesis and this reconfigured
thesis are that the part of wrongdoing to which duress pertains is not justification
but rather fault regarding the absence of a justifying circumstance; that the context-
sensitive evaluation of the defendant's wrongdoing occurs in the adjudication of
individual cases and not in the general legislation of defenses; and that acquittal on
grounds of non-fault due to mistake is nevertheless an acquittal that detracts from
the law's stringency. If W & M are out to eliminate an excuse rather than to
establish a justification, then these differences might not matter to them. If the
analysis of fault regarding the absence of a justifying circumstance captured all
that we want to say about duress, then I might join W & M in proposing that we
abolish the excuse of duress and require defendants to argue duress only insofar as
it is premised on non-fault.
I cannot speak for W & M, of course, but no such rapprochement will be
forthcoming from my side. I do not think that either a justification argument or a
non-fault argument captures all that we mean to say or do when we recognize
duress as an excuse.
Here is a scenario that I believe calls for an excuse of duress. Suppose that
Dad goes to pick up his three-year-old daughter from daycare and finds that
Deranged is holding her class hostage. As it happens, Deranged has a gun to the
head of Dad's child and states that he intends to kill her. Dad pleads with
Deranged to let him take his child in peace. Deranged tells Dad that he can do so
"S Id. at 910.
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if Dad kills the other children in the room. Carefully keeping his gun to the head
of Dad's child, Deranged kicks a second gun toward Dad, out of the extensive
arsenal Deranged has piled up in a comer of the classroom. Dad picks up the gun
and kills the other children-let's say there are five of them-and, miraculously,
Deranged is true to his word. Dad escapes with his child.
I would analyze this case as duress premised on excuse in this way. Dad's
wrongdoing here is complete. Dad has violated the prohibition on killing human
beings, and none of the exceptions to that prohibition obtain. While he has
defended the life of his daughter, no version of defense-of-others will allow Dad to
do this at the cost of five innocent lives. Lesser evils, however one conceives of it,
is a basic principle of all the justifications, including defense-of-others, and Dad
has clearly opted for the greater evil. Furthermore, Dad cannot possibly argue that
he was mistaken about a justification. He knows that from any objective point of
view, he has created more harm than he has prevented. Dad's only defense lies in
the fact that when he acted he could not possibly have made that objective point of
view his own. He did wrong and committed a crime, and he did so knowingly and
deliberately. But he did this because he did not have the fortitude to watch his own
child die when he was in a position to prevent it.
The only conceivable ground on which Dad could be acquitted is an excuse
premised on the notion that no one who would presume to punish Dad would have
the fortitude to watch his own child die were he in a position to prevent it, and that
therefore no one who would presume to punish Dad has a moral right to do so.
The traditional ban on duress in homicide cases should not preclude such an
argument because that ban can only be premised on an equality of lives or a net-
savings-of-lives principle, either of which is a stray bit of lesser evils rationale that
is irrelevant to the excuse claimed here.
It is not obvious that Dad ought to be excused here. We might well conclude,
on careful consideration, that he should have displayed more fortitude and should
not have inflicted five times as much grief as the grief he could not bear himself. I
think it is obvious, however, that Dad's argument is a cogent one, and that the
question is one that could not be decided as a matter of law. Dad has a defense, an
argument, based on duress as an excuse. It is, moreover, an argument that is not
quite captured by either a justification argument or an argument based on non-fault
regarding the absence of a justifying circumstance.
V. CONCLUSION
In the end, I think Westen and Mangiafico underestimate the task they set
themselves. They attempt to prove, and not just to illustrate, a conceptual point
with cases. Justification and excuse are conceptually distinct defenses, but
conceptually distinct defenses may be extensionally congruent. That is, arguments
in the nature of justification and excuse may, and often do, apply equally well to a
single set of facts. The ultimate categorization of the case as an instance of a
defense-that is, whether D's case is really one of excuse or justification-is
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either a fact consisting of the jury's reasoning in its ultimate disposition of the case
or, more plausibly, an unanswerable question (and, of course, with a hypothetical
case, it is really unanswerable). Cases can illustrate the conceptual differences
between the defenses, but it is too much to ask of any case that it prove a
conceptual distinction between defenses by precluding all extensional overlap
between defenses. W & M have demonstrated extensional overlap between
justification and excuse arguments in cases of duress. They have not demonstrated
that, conceptually speaking, duress is only a justification and never an excuse.
